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A 1957 Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) pamphlet entitled “Rural
Family Defense” opened by stressing to farmers the importance of their responsibility to
the country during the Cold War. “If YOUR farm and family are NOT endangered by
enemy attack, you must keep on producing food, fibre, dairy products, and other output
essential to winning the war. The Nation’s survival then will depend on how well you
prepare now.”1 This focus on ensuring that American farmers kept an ample supply of
food and agricultural products on hand was a common theme for civil defense agencies
such as the FCDA and other governmental agencies, like the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and Federal Extension Service (FES) throughout the Cold War.
Besides encouraging rural Americans to keep the nation’s food supply well stocked, rural
civil defense policies encouraged rural Americans to be willing to host potential urban
evacuees as well as to build and stock their a fallout shelter for their family and their
livestock.
Over the past thirty years, many historians have researched and written about
Cold War civil defense. While historians like Laura McEnaney, Paul Boyer, Guy Oakes,
and Tracy C. Davis, have all looked at impact that civil defense had on Americans during
the Cold War, these historians have only looked at the ways that these policies affected
the majority of Americans who lived in urban, industrial, or suburban settings. Historians
such as Boyer and Davis have researched on the psychological affects that civil defense
measures had on American society during the Cold War. Others, like McEnaney and
Oakes, have argued that family fallout shelters increasingly militarized the American
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family during the era, by promoting a military like structure to family shelters and
preparedness plans. 2
Yet, while many historians have researched the affects that civil defense had on
Americans during the Cold War, little historical inquiry has been spent on the impact that
these polices had on rural families. Only one historian, Jenny Barker Devine, has looked
at the impact of Cold War civil defense measures on farm and rural families. While
Devine’s study is the first of its kind, more research is needed on rural civil defense.
Devine’s study provides an important overview of rural civil defense and views about the
new advances in nuclear technology. However, there has been no further research on the
ways that these policies were interpreted by federal, state, and county governments or the
ways that individual farm families viewed the policies of evacuation and fallout shelters.
With little secondary material on rural civil and defense, and none that approach
the subject on a regional or community level, many of the sources that have been
incorporated in this paper come from previously untapped sources. These sources include
the Rural Civil Defense records from the Extension Service Records held at the Oregon
State University Archives and newspaper articles from a regional agricultural newspaper
in the Northwest, the Capital Press. Both of these sources have provided many valuable
views towards rural civil defense and the ways that rural Northwesterners interpreted
these policies.
The tension between the United States and Soviet Union that created and
maintained the Cold War ran from near the end of the 1940s through the start of the
2
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1990s. While the Cold War lasted forty years, the scope of this paper will cover from
1950 to 1970, during the height of the civil defense rhetoric in the United States. After
the late 1960s and 1970s, the rhetoric behind civil defense measures started to decrease
with low popular and political support. During these twenty years, however, national and
international events such as the successful test of the Soviet Union’s Atomic Bomb and
both countries development of a more deadly and horrific Hydrogen Bomb, kept the idea
of civil defense in the minds of American civilians and government officials who moved
the policies onto the public. International political events, like the Bay of Pigs and the
Cuban Missile Crisis, also added to the sense of fear of an Atomic attack as many
Americans viewed the possibility of an Atomic or Hydrogen Bomb attack from the
Soviets as a real possibility.
Circumstances within different regions in the United States also generated to the
use of civil defense measures. Military bases, nuclear testing sites, and large cities all
made a region vulnerable to an attack. In the Midwest, large military bases like Offutt Air
Force Base and the Strategic Air Command (SAC), both located in Nebraska, added to
the list of the region’s likely targets. In the West, nuclear testing sites like Hanford
Engineering Works in Southeastern Washington added to the threat that Westerns felt
from the possibility of a nuclear attack. With variations between different regions in the
nation, civil defense measures in the United States lay in a hierarchical structure. The
federal government created the nation’s main civil defense policies, while state and
county governments attempted to follow national guidelines and polices.
At the national level, federal agencies like the FCDA, the USDA, and the FES,
provided the rhetoric that state and county governments were to incorporate in their state
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and community. At the state level, regional differences added to the ways that states
responded to the national policies. 3 In the West, the presence of nuclear testing sites like
Hanford, added to the level of response that Western states gave towards civil defense.
Likewise, the presence of military bases like Offutt Air Force Base and SAC in the
Midwest also affected the level of response that Midwestern states gave towards civil
defense. Finally, at the county and individual level, civil defense polices were
incorporated with varying levels of support. Between 1950 and 1970, rural Americans in
the Midwest and Northwest, had to cope with a financial, logistical, and moral burden
that resulted from civil defense policies that favored urban and industrial Americans.

Federal Views Towards Rural Americans and Civil Defense

While the majority of Americans did not live in rural areas during the second half
of the twentieth century, federal, state, and county governments promoted rural
Americans to be more involved in civil defense measures that the United States enacted
during the Cold War then non-rural Americans.4 After the Soviet Union successfully
tested an Atomic Bomb in August 1949, the United States was no longer the only nation
with the capability to wreak massive havoc with a single bomb. Civil defense measures
enacted during the Cold War attempted to directly quell the fears that arose from a
theoretical Soviet attack. Evacuation routes designed to move Americans out of urban
and other high-risk areas out to rural and low-risk regions became one of the primary
3
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civil defense measures during the early Cold War. These plans often made rural regions
the endpoints for the urban evacuees. According to Rural Family Defense, rural
Americans were to be in “charge of reception centers for evacuees, have positions of
responsibility and authority regarding feeding, shelter, sanitation facilities, first aid,
welfare, billeting in homes and in farm facilities.” However, the pamphlet gave little
information to farm families on the ways that they were suppose to pay for these centers
and the good required to stock them or the amount of compensation that the federal
government would pass on to these families after the crisis was over. The pamphlet also
ignored the logistical burden that rural Americans received of finding all of the supplies
that they would need or the space to house urban evacuees.5
Like evacuation plans that often assumed rural Americans would be ready and
willing to provide for the vast number of urban evacuees, the government’s policy toward
fallout shelters also placed an unfair burden on rural Americans. In urban and industrial
regions, public fallout shelters provided an effective way for the government to provide a
sense of security and protection in the event of an attack. In rural areas, however, these
public shelters were ineffective with a small and spread out population. In these regions,
the government promoted private shelters to keep farm families and other rural
Americans, livestock, and crops protected from nuclear fallout. These private shelters
moved the expense of building and stocking the shelter from the government to rural
Americans. Private shelters also placed an ethical burden on rural Americans who have
traditionally been viewed as the ‘moral backbone’ of the nation by promoting virtue, a
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hard work ethic, and traditional family values.6 Besides being responsible for their
family’s safety during a hypothetical attack, farm families were also responsible for
ensuring the safety of their livestock and crops from nuclear fallout.

Nuclear Threat in the Northwest: Hanford Nuclear Reservation

Despite a lower population in the Northwest and Midwest, these regions were still
vulnerable to nuclear attack. Military bases in the Midwest like Offutt Air Force Base and
the SAC in Nebraska and nuclear testing sites across the Western United States added to
the possibility of attack in these regions. While rural regions included small and spread
out populations, the vast spread of fallout that would have occurred after an attack also
added to the threat that farmers had from an Atomic attack. According to Bruce Hevly
and John M. Findlay, the American West seemed like the perfect place for the
establishment of nuclear testing sites such as Hanford in Southeastern Washington. Hevly
and Findlay argue it was fitting that workers in the American West helped develop and
test nuclear technology during the Cold War, since both the West and nuclear power have
“generally been a realm of dramatic hopes and fears, a place often likened to hell or to
heaven.”7
The federal government also saw the possibility that the West generated by
viewing the region as ‘relatively empty, and they valued that undeveloped space for its
apparent capacity to buffer people from the dangers associated with making and testing
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nuclear weapons and storing hazardous wastes,” according to Hevly and Findlay.8 An
optimistic view of opportunity in the American West has also been extended toward its
inhabitants. Images of the hardworking, rugged, and virtuous pioneer have often been
bestowed upon Westerners. In the 1957 thirty-minute CBS documentary on Portland
Oregon’s evacuation plans, entitled “The Day Called ‘X,’” actor Glenn Ford introduces
Oregonians as being “friendly, and rugged in the tradition of the Oregon Trail.”9
However, these ‘friendly and rugged” Westerns also had to deal with large nuclear testing
sites that interrupted these rural and ‘empty’ landscapes.
Peter Goin has called these regions where nuclear testing sites moved on to rural
landscapes “nuclear landscapes” that are “landscapes of fear.” One of these ‘nuclear
landscapes’ is the 570 square mile Hanford Engineering Works - later renamed the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation- in Southeastern Washington. However, before the federal
government could begin construction at the Hanford site in 1943, the roughly 1,200
people who lived in the small farming communities of Hanford and White Bluffs needed
to relocate away from the site. 10 Michael D’Antonio notes that while the region was too
dry and arid to grow many crops, the Hanford and White Bluffs farmers had orchards,
planted winter wheat and let cattle graze on nearby ranges.11
According to Michele Stenehjem Gerber, the news of the site’s selection came as
a surprise to local residents. During a mass meeting held in Richmond, local residents
were quick to ask the representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers why the
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government wanted the land that was too arid and difficult to use. However, the Corps of
Engineers were reluctant to let slip the purpose behind the site’s selection. Colonel
Franklin T. Matthias told the local farmers who were being moved off their land that “If I
told you what the government is doing, I’d be court-martialed tomorrow.”12 Within
months, the region drastically changed from rural farming communities to boasting a
population of nearly 51,000 people as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the
construction site. The region continued to grow as construction workers boosted the
population to over 95,000.13
This rapid change in the nature of local communities directly affected the
surrounding towns around Hanford that ballooned after the site was established. As a
result from the influx of scientists and others who were involved with the nuclear site, the
surrounding Tri-Cities of Richmond, Pasco, and Kennewick quickly grew. By the end of
WWII, a federal edict restricted people who were not operating personnel at Hanford
from residing in the town; the town quickly grew to boast a population of 13,000. By
1949, another 10,000 moved into Richland. While the federal government restricted who
could live in Richland, the surround towns of Pasco and Kennewick also underwent a
population boom, by 1949, 65,000 people called the region home. In less than ten years,
one of the government’s main reasons for choosing the rural and isolated region for an
Atomic testing site became moot. The ‘isolated’ region grew from a small population of
around 1200 persons to a sizeable population of over 65,000.14
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The rapid change that occurred in Southeast Washington after Hanford was
established also had an effect on local farm families in the region. Besides displacing the
rural families who had previously lived around the Hanford site, the site’s presence and
the expansion of the Tri-Cities further stressed the local food supply. The former towns
of Hanford and White Bluffs had been well known for their fruit orchards. However,
because of the possible radioactive hazards that the Hanford site caused, farm families
abandoned the orchards, and later cut the trees down, leaving fields of stumps behind.15

Rural Civil Defense and Evacuation Plans:
National Evacuation Plans

While only a few Americans lived in rural areas during the second half of the
twentieth century, the production of agricultural goods and protection of farm families
and other rural Americans from nuclear fallout were still carefully considered by the
federal agencies that established the nation’s main civil defense measures during the Cold
War. However, according to Devine, rural Americans were typically viewed as a
“homogenous group” who were willing and able to take an active role in civil defense
and “rarely in need of direct assistance from the federal government.”16 With this view in
mind, rural regions were often the end points for evacuation routes from urban and other
high-risk centers. A 1956 FCDA pamphlet, Home Protection Exercises, highlighted a
view towards civil defense that was typical for the federal government during the 1950s.
The pamphlet stated, “With the development of more powerful nuclear weapons,
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evacuation is the best defense against enemy attack. Evacuation depends upon having
sufficient warning time; however, we cannot be sure that we will have sufficient warning
time in all cases. Therefore, the family will need shelter. The better the shelter, the better
the chance for survival.”17
The director of the FCDA, Val Peterson, also promoted a focus on evacuation
plans. In an article in the September 1954 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Peterson argued, “On the whole, it is foolish to talk any more about remaining in the city
to duck and take cover.” Yet, not all Americans agreed with Peterson’s position. The
article noted that while the Bulletin agreed with Peterson, he had not yet sold all local
communities on evacuation plans. The Bulletin noted that Peterson “had to get across his
ideas to the local communities many of which looked upon evacuation as utterly silly.” 18
Director Peterson was a former governor of Nebraska, a state heavily dependent
upon agriculture and farm families. Yet, Peterson and the federal government took a
similar stance on the relationship between rural Americans and evacuation plans. In an
interview with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in December of 1954 Peterson
responded to a question that dealt with the legal responsibility that rural Americans had
towards potential urban evacuees in the event that evacuation was required. Peterson told
the interviewer that:

You have a higher responsibility to your fellow man than that which is written in
the law. And I should also not be inclined to want to dispute my responsibility
with the evacuees as they came into my front yard. But for those souls who do
want to insist upon being legal about this, should an attack come upon this
country, there would be legal authority that could be employed to require us to
17
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perform what is actually our moral duty, if necessary. I trust that kind of action
should never be necessary.19

Director Peterson was not the only source that told rural Americans they would be
responsible for the care and protection of urban evacuees in the event that evacuation
plans were set in motion. Rural Family Defense also played on the “moral duty” of rural
Americans that Peterson stressed. In the 1957 pamphlet, farm and rural families were told
that “Every rural family and community should be prepared to help care for evacuees
from attacked areas. There is no way to determine in advance what rural areas will be
safe to receive and care for these evacuated persons.” Rural Family Defense appealed to
the assumed moral values of rural Americans in a second section, but also appealed to
rural Americans self interest. “Rural families may be asked to help the people in attacked
areas. Your own safety, the protection of your property, and the future of your income
depend directly on a quick restoration of the economy between rural areas and cities.” 20
Throughout the early and mid 1950s, Peterson and the FCDA held annual
evacuation drills throughout the nation. Shortly after Peterson announced the evacuation
plan as a means of national civil defense, several cities across the United States took part
in evacuation drills as a part of “Operation Alert.” The purpose of “Operation Alert” was
to show the feasibility of evacuation. While the national policy of evacuation went into
effect, many states started to form their own evacuation plans. Peterson’s home state of
Nebraska “published a three-volume contingency plan entitled the State of Nebraska
Operational Survival Plan.” This contingency plan provided information on the

19
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evacuation routes for the 640,000 people who lived in the major cities in the state and the
Offutt Air Force Base and the SAC.21

Evacuation Plans: “Utterly Silly”

However, support for evacuation was not universal. Besides the local
communities that considered Peterson’s evacuation plans as “utterly silly”, urban
residents were also cautious of evacuation plans. City planners and highway
commissioners were concerned if the road system would be able to handle a mass
evacuation from an urban center.22 McEnaney argues that major labor unions such as the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were
concerned with the effect that mass mobilization out of the cities would have on urban
workers and their families. The unions’ response was that either the state or federal
government provide for the workers “social and economic needs” in the event of
dispersal to suburban or rural areas during evacuation.23
While rural Americans were fearful that their communities might quickly become
refugee camps for urban Americans, complications of race and segregation also affected
views towards evacuation from both rural and urban Americans. In 1954, Mobile
Alabama held a mock evacuation drill. Dubbed “Operation Scat” by the FCDA, Scat
tested the level of participation by the city’s black population in the drill. The FCDA
hired ethnographers from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to monitor the drill.

21
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The report from the NAS noted that the low participation levels of Mobile’s black
citizens was most likely due to local and economic conditions rather then a desire by the
African American community to ignore the drill. The NAS reported that many African
Americans did not own radios or televisions and that a higher rate of illiteracy among the
city’s black population limited the effectiveness of the announcement of Scat by local
print media.
With little prior warning of the drill, the NAS reported on a rumor that Operation
Scat was not a test in the city, but that Scat’s purpose was to bomb the city and to kill of
“most of the Negroes so that they wouldn’t have to go through with school desegregation.” During the drill, the NAS report also noted, few African Americans owned
their own vehicles and were underserved by public transport, which represented a
problem when evacuation plans called for the mass use of public transportation and
private cars.24 When asked by a NAS observer if whites would pick up African
Americans during a real evacuation, a white police officer responded by first supporting
segregation and then claimed that he would pick up a black man if he was not going to be
picked up by anyone else. However, according to historian Tracy C. Davis, the
“researcher got a clear impression from this that whites would always be given
priority.”25 While the NAS reported that participation levels were low across Mobile’s
black neighborhoods, McEnaney argues that African American’s low level of response
could have been protesting “white police, racist local civil defense programs, or the
travesty of self-help without the means to carry it out,” and not civil defense in general.26
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Race relations during evacuation were again considered by the FCDA and other
civil defense agencies even though, according to McEnaney, the “FCDA annual meetings
and literature avoided direct conversation about the racial aspects of evacuation.”27 A
study done by John Hopkins examined evacuation routes from Washington D.C. into
rural Virginia and Maryland. The study predicted that “social problems” would be likely
to emerge “when predominantly Negro populations [are] evacuated to predominantly
white areas.”28 Even though the FCDA attempted to limit any frank discussion about race
and evacuation, the topic sometimes seeped into to the discussion. At the 1954 women’s
conference held by the FCDA, Marjorie Husted, better known as Betty Crocker,
promoted the sense of “community” to housewives while also advising them to prepare
for “racial… invasions” if they lived in evacuation reception centers.29
Scientists and scholars unconnected with the FCDA and civil defense also looked
at the possible racial tensions that could arise during evacuation. Francis R. Allen, a
sociologist at Florida State University during the 1950s, noticed that race relations could
be a potential problem for evacuation and that more research needed to be done on the
issue. Allen questioned “what special problems relevant for civil defense are involved in
dealing with Negroes in the South, immigrant populations in the Northeast, Middle West,
or other cities, Pacific Coast residents, and the like? In short, what racial, nationality, and
local-culture items not previously mentioned may be identified which would affect civil
defense activities or problems?”30 However, while Allen suggested that further research
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was needed on any potential race issues, the topic was left mostly untouched by several
state civil defense agencies including in Oregon.
In the Northwest, questions over race relations were more likely to be between
whites and migrant immigrant laborers than between whites and African Americans.
Potential race issues were mostly ignored. The Oregon State University Rural Civil
Defense program, sponsored by the Oregon State Cooperative Extension Service, wrote
extensive biannual progress reports to the USDA on their activity in the state. Only one
report from the six years that the program was active hints at race relations. The “Rural
Civil Defense Progress Report January 1 – June 30, 1966” noted that, "One meeting was
held in Jackson County Court where migrant housing design was discussed with the
County Court, Associated Fruit Growers, and the country extension agent. The RCD
engineer suggested possible designs of houses that would provide maximum fallout
protection.”31 Yet the report did not mention if the discussion about increasing fallout
protection in housing for the mostly Latino migrant workers between the Jackson County
Court, Fruit Growers and country extension agent went any further then a basic
discussion that was quickly forgotten as the meeting progressed. However, the Rural
Civil Defense program in Oregon was established near the end of 1962, well after most
evacuation plans had been exchanged for public and private fallout shelters as the
nation’s primary means of civil defense. Any issues that could have arisen between
migrant workers and white farmers may have been more pronounced if the Rural Civil
Defense program existed during the 1950s when evacuation plans were in their prime
across the nation.
31
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Regional Evacuation Plans

While the FCDA and USDA laid out the groundwork for rural civil defense, civil
defense measures were also dependent upon the level of response that various states gave
to civil defense. According to Allen, “it is apparent that the characteristics which make
one area attractive as a target for military attack and another area unattractive vary over a
nation, hence the nuclear threat is not the same in all parts of the United States.” Allen
continued to argue that different regional factors such as large population centers,
military bases and other factors all contributed to a region’s threat level.32
According to Allen, the number of people who lived in “critical target areas” of
areas with “40,000 or more industrial employees” in the Midwest and Northwest were
much lower then in the Northeast and Great Lakes region. While over 44 percent of the
nation’s total population lived in critical target areas in the Northeast in 1953, only two
and half percent of the nation’s population lived in a critical target area in Kansas,
Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming combined. The West Coast states of Washington,
Oregon, California and Nevada included over 12.5 percent of the nation’s population who
lived in a target area. 33

Evacuation Plans in Nebraska and Oregon

The state of Nebraska developed a comprehensive three-volume plan for
evacuation during Val Peterson’s tenure as director of the FCDA. While Peterson was an

32
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active proponent for evacuation, the resulting Nebraska Plan was slightly less
enthusiastic. The Nebraska Plan acknowledged, “no effective shelter now exists in the
target areas, and evacuation to safer areas is the only alternative remaining.” The
evacuation routes that the state developed, routed people out of the five critical targets in
Nebraska to rural regions across the state and into the neighboring states of Colorado,
Kansas, and Iowa.34 Despite its long length, the State of Nebraska Operational Survival
Plan was, according to Devine, “broad and somewhat vague and rarely took the local
conditions into account when selecting reception areas.”35 State officials in charge of the
Survival Plan expected rural residents in the state to ‘establish Mass Care Centers,’ where
rural Nebraskans were tasked with “providing food, health care, and sanitation” for urban
evacuees.”36 Devine argues that state officials even left the “logistics of feeding, housing,
and caring for refugees to town and county officials, offering little assistance to areas
with sparse populations or few resources.”37
Like Nebraska, Oregon also created its own plan for evacuating people out of the
state’s largest urban target, Portland, and assumed that rural Oregonians and the rest of
the state would be willing and able to provide for evacuated Portlanders in the event of an
attack. In 1955, the FCDA sponsored a test of Portland’s evacuation plan. Earning the
name of “Operation Green Light” the mock evacuation plan called for the evacuation of
six miles in the heart of the city with an expected 200,000 participants. The FCDA
expected evacuees to leave the city in their vehicles and follow the green lights out of
town. However, while the FCDA expected 200,000 people to participate in the drill, only
34
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90,000-100,000 Portlanders participated in Operation Green Light, and were able to
evacuate the city in thirty-four to forty minutes. According to the FCDA’s Annual Report
for 1955, “Approximately 90,000 persons in the metropolitan section moved out of the
evacuation area of 970 blocks in an estimated 29,423 vehicles – while additional
thousands walked out of the central district.”38 However, while the response was half of
what the FCDA expected for Operation Green Light, Oregon’s test of its evacuation plans
caught the attention of a documentary crew from CBS. In December of 1957, CBS
showed a thirty-minute film on the city’s evacuation and civil defense plans, including
the ways that tests like Operation Green Light would serve the city in the event it was
attacked.
The CBS film, “The Day Called ‘X’” was narrated by actor Glenn Ford and
starred “The People of the City of Portland” as well as the city’s mayor, civil defense
director and other high ranking public officials.39 The Day Called ‘X’ used Operation
Green Light to show the ways that the city was prepared for evacuation, in the event a
Hydrogen Bomb did head for the city. A radio announcer, during the film, made sure that
evacuating drivers “remember there is a traffic plan for the evacuation of the city. All
cars in the downtown area must follow the green lights, they will lead you out of the
danger area by the quickest route.”40 While the film promoted civil defense preparedness,
the depiction of the evacuation of the city and the establishment of the city’s civil defense
members in a large publicly funded civil defense bunker, like Green Light itself,
exaggerated the effectiveness of evacuation.
38
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Both Operation Green Light and “The Day Called ‘X’” showed a calm evacuation
out of the city. During Green Light, a calm evacuation was more likely since only a
fraction of the entire city participated in the test that the local media announced the test’s
date and time beforehand. However, it is unlikely that the city would evacuate in a way
similar to the way that Ford described in “The Day Called ‘X’” where he notes that
“quietly, without panic, the city organizes, become mobile the best it can” after warning
from an alert siren and CONELRAD—the precursor to the Emergency Broadcast
System—radio report. Like many of the FCDA and USDA pamphlets, “The Day Called
‘X’” downplayed the effect of fallout and the blast from an Atomic or Hydrogen Bomb.
Facing the threat of a Hydrogen Bomb blast, a city weather expert reported to the city’s
civil defense director, Jack Lowe: “Let’s face facts gentlemen, if we have a blast on
target, downtown Portland, it will be hours, and probably days before we can get back
in.” However, if a Hydrogen Bomb did hit downtown Portland, there would be little of
the city to return to for the evacuated Portlanders.41
The film also brings attention to a massive, nearly 19,000 square foot
underground bunker that had been established to ensure that the city government would
be able to continue functioning in the event of an attack. Located under Kelly Butte on
the east site of the city, the Portland Disaster and Civil Defense Control Center was
buried just six miles from downtown and allowed the city government and civil defense
board a secure operational center without having to leave the metropolitan area.
However, the nearly 19,000 square foot bunker was not an inexpensive project, costing
the city and the people of Portland $670,000 dollars. While approval for the shelter came
after the passage of a 1952 levy, a good portion of the cost of the shelter did not come
41
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directly out of the pockets of Portlanders. An article in the Oregonian from 1956 noted
that, “Portland is getting something of a bargain in the control center. Of the estimated
$500,000 cost of the structure… half will be provided from federal funds. Of the
additional $100,000 for radio equipment associated with the control center… 50 per cent
will come from federal funds and 25 per cent from state funds.”42
The main focus of “The Day Called ‘X’” was on the ways that Portland’s
residents would evacuate and the reestablishment of the city government. The film gave
little attention to the regions where evacuating Portlanders would go. The only mention
that the film made was that the towns of Forest Grove and Mt. Angel had been
established as emergency medical centers. The rest of the state was deemed a “support
area” in the event of an evacuation of Portland.43 While there was little emphasis on rural
regions during the 1955 test and the CBS film, rural regions were mentioned on other
tests of the state’s evacuation plans. During the 1958 Operation Alert, an article in the
Oregonian reported, “mass feeding exercises are planned in Morrow, Polk and Gilliam
Counties,” rural counties where evacuees would head if the evacuation were real.44
The impact that rural regions were to expect was also recorded in an article from
a regional agriculture newspaper, the Capital Press. The Capital Press informed its rural
readers after the yearly test of Operation Alert in 1955 that “in event of enemy attack,
civil defense preparations in small towns and rural areas will be as important as those
developed by target areas.” The article also included information from the state’s civil
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defense director, Arthur M. Sheets. Sheets acknowledged that rural Oregonians would
have the ‘burden’ of caring for evacuating Portlanders. Nevertheless, he offered little
advice on the ways that rural Oregonians were expected to care for them. Sheets
remarked:
A city devastated by atomic attack could not recover through its own power... To
small cities throughout the state would fall the burden of supplying police
officers, fire fighting equipment, rescue units, first aid teams, emergency welfare
teams and other resources. In addition, they would be on the receiving end of a
large-scale evacuation. . . [Each] city can expect to double its population within
hours after an attack.” 45

The Capital Press article showed where evacuating Portlanders were expected to
go in the event of an attack. Six different reception centers were established in small
communities outside Portland in Scappoose, Carlton, Brooks, Estacada, Sandy, and Hood
River. From each reception center, evacuees would be divvied up and placed in various
counties across the state. The Estacada reception area was expected to receive around
64,000 people who, according to the Capital Press, “would be divided between 25,000
for Douglas County and 39,000 for Lane County.” The nearly 96,000 people at the
reception center in Sandy would mostly be sent to counties in Southern Oregon. The
article stated, “500 would go to Clackamas County, 5000 in Jefferson County, 20,000 in
Deschutes County, 8000 in Crook County, 40,000 in Klamath County, and 38,000 in
Jackson County.”46
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Rural Civil Defense and Fallout Shelters:
Transition from Evacuation to Fallout Shelters
The feasibility of evacuation plans such as the one established in Oregon showed
the ridiculousness of evacuation as a means of civil defense. While leaving high target
areas was a relatively safe way of protecting a major city, the impact and little resources
that were supplied to small towns and rural areas that were the end points of evacuation
routes, would have prevented the plan from having the desired affect. As a result, public
and private fallout shelters replaced evacuation as the nation’s primary civil defense
measure by the early 1960s. However, while the federal government, through the FCDA,
promoted fallout shelters, the FCDA and USDA promoted private shelters to rural
Americans. At the state level, state branches of the FES administered through land grant
universities often became the main agency responsible for rural civil defense. In Oregon,
the Oregon State University Cooperative Extension Service established a Rural Civil
Defense program in December 1962, months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The program
continued through the decade, before it was cut as Oregon and the rest of the nation
started to tire of civil defense by the early 1970s.
Some of the support for fallout shelters instead of evacuation plans came from a
more widespread knowledge about the effects of fallout. After military tests in the South
Pacific during the late 1950s showed that radioactive fallout could travel thousands of
miles, civil defense became more of a concern in rural areas. By the end of 1960, fortyeight states had a rural civil defense program in place.47 As more knowledge about
radioactive fallout became more common and as a result of foreign policy crises, such as
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the Bay of Pigs incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Congress began to support fallout
shelters as a means of civil defense. By the end of 1961, Congress had set aside $207
million to “identify, stock, and maintain buildings” as fallout shelters.48 While public
shelters would provide an effective way for highly populated cities and industrial areas,
rural Americans were too isolated from one another for public shelters to provide an
effective means of protection against fallout. In rural areas, federal and state governments
stressed home fallout shelters as the only way to protect one’s family.49

The FCDA and Family Fallout Shelters

Just like the nation’s policy towards evacuation, fallout shelters directly affected
rural families just like the rest of the nation. McEnaney argues that civil defense became
a “paramilitary program, situated between the priorities of the defense establishment and
the cultural ideals of the postwar home front.”50 The FCDA focused its civil defense
plans around the family unit during the 1960s for several reasons. One of these reasons
was that FCDA officials viewed the nuclear family as the home front version of the
domino theory. They feared that if the family unit failed, that the rest of American society
would quickly follow.51 Another reason that the FCDA focused on the family unit for
civil defense was that it took the financial responsibility away from the government and
placed it on the family. Throughout the 1960s, the FCDA stressed family preparedness
for an Atomic attack. As more families used their own money to create their own fallout
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shelter and gathered the necessary supplies to stock their shelter, there was less need for
the federal government to build and stock public shelters.
Family preparedness appealed to the FCDA because the family unit would be less
likely to fall apart if there was an attack.52 It also provided a way for the FCDA to insert
military style techniques into a civilian population. Civil Defense pamphlets like Home
Protection Exercises, according to McEnaney, aimed “to transform families into well
trained paramilitary units that required little or no government assistance.”53 Pamphlets
like Home Protection Exercises condensed family preparedness into eight “family action
exercises.” These “exercises” consisted of “warning siren recognition, home shelter
preparation, home firefighting and prevention, rescue techniques, food and water storage
and first aid.”54 All of these “action exercises” were still taught in civil defense literature
over a decade later. The 1968 civil defense booklet, In Time of Emergency devotes a
chapter to each of these “exercises.”55
Although it was published fifteen years after Home Protection Exercises, In Time
of Emergency provided a detailed how-to guide on building a home fallout shelter and
other preparedness exercises. In Time of Emergency provided information on how a
family could prepare for a nuclear attack by building and stocking their own fallout
shelter. The pamphlet recommended that four inches of concrete could be used to
“provide fallout protection.”56 If a family was unable to afford concrete, other materials
acted as alternative sources of fallout protection. The booklets stated that “for
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comparative purposes, 4 inches of concrete” would be equal to: “5 to 6 inches of bricks…
7 inches of earth… 10 inches of water, 14 inches of books or magazines” and “18 inches
of wood.” 57
While the FCDA used military style techniques in preaching family preparedness,
they also attempted to “domesticate” the Bomb to the civilian population. McEnaney
states that civil defense officials promoted domestication of the Bomb not to numb
“people to nuclear war, but detoxified their imaginings of it. Instead of macabre scenarios
of death, domestication showcased people’s ability to live in a state of constant
readiness.”58 Civil defense literature broke down the global issue that the nuclear threat
presented and broke it down into small issues that could be taken care of by the nuclear
family. The threat of nuclear attack became just another routine household chore. The
1950 booklet, Survival under Atomic Attack, claimed that “radioactive particles act much
the same as ordinary, everyday dust” which could be cleaned up with a rag.59
In an attempt to remove the psychological dangers that were present in a civil
defense program that promoted preparedness for a nuclear attack, civil defense officials
McEnaney argues, “cleaned up the language of nuclear warfare.” Nuclear euphemisms
were often present in civil defense pamphlets. Nuclear fallout became common dust,
“fallout shelters were ‘family,’ family-type,’ or ‘home’ shelters.”60
Another reason that domestication was widely used in civil defense was that it
promoted the “traditional” family values found in the “nuclear” family: the breadwinning
husband, the housewife, and two to three children. Domestication and family
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preparedness exercises promoted closer family relationships and units that would be able
to survive if there was a nuclear attack.61 Like the evacuation drills during the early and
mid 1950s, volunteers and families tested the effects of an extended period in a fallout
shelters. One of these tests, done by Princeton University, took the five-member Powner
family into a shelter on the University’s campus for a two-week stay. During the
Powner’s fourteen-day stay, the university’s psychology professors monitored the
unknowing Powner family with a microphone to record their emotional and mental states.
Before and after the Powner’s shelter stay their emotional and mental states were also
recorded. After the family emerged from the shelter, each member of the Powner family
was subjected to even more tests to see if any of the members had suffered any “ill
effects.”62
If there were any “ill effects”, the Princeton professors did not report them to the
government, and when the family spoke to the media after the tests were over, Mr.
Powner, who spoke for the family, provided a glowing review of his family’s experience.
The Princeton professors did note that the middle child had, “suffered a bit, as evidenced
by his moody withdrawal from family activities,” however, he was “quickly brought out
of this attitude by one administration of a tranquilizer.”63 After the Powners had emerged
from the shelter, the one topic that Mr. Powner stressed was how the experience had
created an “integration of the family” where Mr. Powner had a “new-found respect for
the entire family.”64 Reviews like the ones that Mr. Powner generated for the media after
their “secret” test was just the type that the FCDA was looking for – reviews that

61

McEnaney, 77.
McEnaney, 68.
63
McEnaney,68.
64
McEnaney, 68.
62

26

portrayed fallout shelters as a way to promote family relationships, values, and behaviors,
while at the same time protecting Americans from radioactive fallout.65
This focus on the family and fallout shelters also extended towards rural families,
where the whole family was often heavily involved in farm operations. Katherine Jellison
notes that during the post-war era, farmwomen took a more active role in farm operations
and helped with field work. According to Jellison “Wives, plus machinery, have taken the
place of hired men or other outside help.” A report form the Wallaces’ Farmer from
1960, found that many farmwomen enjoyed working the fields. Roughly fifty percent of
women who responded to the poll participated in field work. Of those who worked in the
field, Jellison notes that “40 percent said they liked field work better than housework,
another 32 percent said that they had no strong preference one way or another, and only
22 percent reported that they did not like doing field work.” 66
However, while farmwomen moved into the fields and took a more active role in
their family’s economic standing, not all rural people were supportive of the move.
According to Jellison, men and especially male farm hands were often resistant to
farmwomen spending more time in the fields and less time inside the home as the farm’s
‘homemaker’. Some farmwomen also supported their role as a homemaker and argued
that farm work should continue to be a secondary role for rural women. A woman from
Audubon County, Iowa argued that, “I know it’s a grand feeling to get out and operate a
tractor that a child can handle. But it seems to me that it isn’t women’s work. A mother
has her place in the home, taking care of her children… [But a] women should be ready
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and willing to run errands, get machinery repairs... [and] …chase the hogs in case they
get out.”67

Fallout Protection for Livestock and Crops

While entire farm families were becoming more involved with the daily
operations of the farm, civil defense authorities viewed the farm family as an essential
part of civil defense. However, while non-rural families were encouraged to protect
themselves, the FCDA and USDA instructed farm families to protect their livestock and
crops as well as their family. Months after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the USDA
produced two pamphlets designed to educate farm families about the ways that they
could protect their livestock and crops from nuclear fallout. The pamphlets entitled, Your
Livestock Can Survive FALLOUT from NUCLEAR ATTACK and Soil, Crops and
FALLOUT from NUCLEAR ATTACK looked at ways that farm families could protect
their livestock and crops from fallout and ensure that the nation’s food supply would
remain functional during and after an attack.68 The USDA’s pamphlet designed for
livestock informed rural Americans that their livestock, like themselves, were vulnerable
to fallout. “For animals, as for humans, shelter is the best protection against fallout…
Shelter facilities should be kept in readiness, and an adequate supply of feed and water
should be at hand.” 69 The USDA, like the FCDA also promoted the use of underground
shelters for livestock. “A good animal shelter is a two-story, basement-type barn with a
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hay-filled loft.” The pamphlet claimed that the use of hay could “reduce radiation
exposure as much as 80 percent.” Even a “good, tight, wooden barn” could reduce
radiation exposure, the pamphlet argued by “about one-half.”70
Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also made sure that farmers knew how to
protect their livestock feed and water from radiation. Like many of the FCDA pamphlets
that downplayed the effects of fallout, the Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also
compared fallout to dust. The USDA recommended that farmers cover exposed haystack
with a tarp. This way, “the fallout will lodge on the tarpaulin and can be removed with it.
The hay could be used immediately.”71 Extra water supplies could also be protected from
fallout if “covered with any material that will keep out dust.”72
Civil Defense officials placed extra emphasis on ensuring that dairy cows and
poultry were protected in the event of an attack. According to Your Livestock can Survive
Fallout, “milking cows should be kept confined and be given uncontaminated feed and
water to prevent contaminating milk until local authorities tell you it is safe to release
them.”73 Likewise, Your Livestock can Survive Fallout also recommended that if farmers
did not have enough feed and water protected from fallout that the limited amount of feed
should be reserved for the milking cows. This way, the milk could be used by the
farmer’s family for both its caloric and liquid value. As for the leftover livestock the
USDA advised, “It would be much better to keep the other animals alive on contaminated
feed and water than to let them die from starvation.”74
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The USDA also viewed poultry as an important source of protein after an attack.
The pamphlet claimed, “Poultry are more resistant to radiation exposure than are other
species of livestock.” Poultry also benefited since they were often kept under some sort
of cover and their feed was processed and kept under cover as well. 75 If farmers were
unable to move their livestock under cover during an attack, the USDA recommended
that they wash them “as soon as it is safe for you to stay outside for a limited time.” The
USDA advised farmers to wear “protective clothing” during washing, even though the
“removal of radioactive fallout from the hides of animals is difficult, and attempts may be
ineffective in some cases.”76
In a separate pamphlet, Soil Crops, and Fallout from Nuclear Attack, the USDA
again offered advice for farmers on the ways that they could reduce radiation exposure
and recommended other types of crops that would be less affected by radiation. Even
though the USDA published both pamphlets months apart, the Department’s advice to
farmers in Soil, Crops, and Fallout advised farmers in a more scientific tone than in Your
Livestock can Survive Fallout. Both pamphlets included a section on what radiation was,
and the ways that farmers could protect their livestock and crops from radiation. Soil,
Crops, and Fallout, however, goes into more depth about radiation and the different types
of radiation. While in the Your Livestock Can Survive, the USDA is more concerned on
making sure that farmers kept their livestock sheltered the best they could, in Soil, Crops,
and Fallout, the USDA is especially concerned with the effect that a particular
radioactive isotope, strontium 90, would have on soil and crops. According to the USDA,
strontium 90 was especially dangerous because “strontium could contaminate soils and
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plants for decades.” Since it was “ chemically similar to calcium,” it would contaminate
“plants, particularly those growing in calcium- deficient soils.” 77
If areas were highly contaminated with strontium, the USDA advised that the land
might have to be taken “out of production for an indefinite period until the radioactivity
decayed to a safe level.” However, if the land was not highly contaminated, the USDA
advised farmers to treat the land with lime and fertilizer as well as to remove the
contaminated vegetation or mulch. The pamphlet strongly recommended that if farmers
had contaminated soil in regions where fields normally required lime or fertilizer for
increased production, that the same application of lime or fertilizer could reduce
strontium radiation “taken up by the plants… by as much as two-thirds.” 78
Like many of the other civil defense pamphlets of the 1950s and 1960s, Soil,
Crops, and Fallout continued to downplay the effects of radioactive fallout. Under a
section entitled, “Decontaminating Harvested Crops,” the pamphlet suggested that if any
crops had been covered with fallout participles “the radioactive participles can be
removed in the same way as any other dust- by washing, vacuum cleaning, or brushing.”
The pamphlet also recommended that for many contaminated food crops, that they would
be “safe to use after washing” and depending on the food, “peeled.” 79 The idea that
irradiated produce would be safe to eat after being washed and peeled is also found in a
series of rural civil defense Public Service Announcements television ads produced by
the U.S. Civil Defense Office from 1965, that claimed contaminated fruit, like an apple
“would be perfectly safe to eat, if you just peel it”. However, the PSA warned viewers
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that, “in disposing of the peelings, remember that they may still contain radioactive
material.” The spot continued by reiterating the information found in Soil Crops, and
Fallout, that fruits and vegetables would be safe to eat if they were properly washed and
peeled.80

Gendered Division of Rural Civil Defense Tasks

Many of the various tasks that the FCDA and USDA promoted to rural families
on the ways that they could protect their family and livestock fell along gender lines. Like
non-rural families, men were considered the head of the farm family. Tasks designed to
protect the family and farm were generally understood to be men’s tasks. Illustrations that
accompanied Your Livestock can Survive Fallout and Soil, Crops and Fallout showed
male farmers carrying out any task that required manual labor such as harvesting crops in
contaminated soil (Figures 1 and 2).81
For tasks that were more domestic in nature, such as stocking the family shelter
with food, first aid, and other materials, or cooking with possibly contaminated foods,
rural women were expected to be in control of these tasks as the farm’s homemaker. The
information in Soil, Crops and Fallout, on how to remove fallout off contaminated
produce and how to safely eat the produce as well as similar information from the
television PSA were directed toward women. The cover of a USDA pamphlet, Family
Food Stockpile for Survival showed a middle class woman happily stocking her family’s
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food pantry (Figure 3).82 The USDA pamphlet informed its mostly female readers:
“Every family should either build up and keep a 2-week supply of regular food in the
home at all times or assemble and maintain a special 2-week stockpile of survival foods
in the fallout shelter or home.” Inside the pamphlet, sample menus showed what foods
would help extend the family’s food supply while providing variety to what the family
ate during a two-week stay in a shelter.83
Home and emergency preparedness activities were also generally directed toward
women. An update in the Capital Press from the Lane County Extension Agent reported:
“Medical self help—the Civil Defense program that prepares a person to cope with
emergency—is sweeping Lane County’s rural communities.” In Junction City, a small
town north of Eugene, “Vard Nelson, Junction City Civil Defense director, is working
with Mrs. Clark Hill; Mrs. Lester Wheeler, safety chairmen of the Junction City home
extension unit; Mrs. Lois Stroda. Business and Professional Women representative; and
Dr. Lee Harris in organizing classes.”84 All of the people listed in the article, except for
the civil defense director and doctor leading the class, were women who would pass
along what they taught in the class to other women. Two of the women, Mrs. Lester
Wheeler and Mrs. Lois Stroda, had connections with other organizations or clubs where
the medical training would be passed on to other rural women in the community.
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Figure 1: Heading from Rural Family Defense that shows a male farmer as the provider of the agricultural
products that American farms produced.

Figure 2: Illustration from Soil, Crops and Fallout that shows a male farmer tilling contaminated soil while
wearing protective clothing.

Figure 3:: Cover from the USDA pamphlet, Family Food Stockpile for Survival, that shows a middle class woman
woma
stocking a food pantry. Women generally
nerally handled tasks like ensuring that the family had a two-week
two
supply of
food in their family shelter and knowing how to process potentially contaminated foods.
foods
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Regional Promotion of Rural Family and Livestock Fallout Shelters

Besides constructing or improvising a fallout shelter for their families, rural
Americans were encouraged to provide fallout protection for their livestock and crops. A
pamphlet published by the Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service in 1966 called
Protecting Family and Livestock From Nuclear Fallout, showed farmers how they could
build or modify structures to provide their livestock with fallout protection. The pamphlet
provided charts that showed the amount of feed, water, and space would be needed for
different animals over a two-week period. It also instructed farmers to consider whether
they needed to consider “mechanical necessities, such as ventilation systems, emergency
power generations, water pumps and maintenance.”85 The Iowa State Cooperative
Extension Service booklet advised that farmers modify their barns and outbuildings, with
“reinforcing structures with more costly and labor-intensive material such as cement,
sand and earth.”86
The Oregon State Cooperative Extension Service, administered through Oregon
State University, established a rural civil defense program on December 1, 1962, weeks
after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis that increased the nation’s interest in
civil defense.87 Over the decade, the rural civil defense program sponsored by the OSU
Extension Service expanded across the Pacific Northwest. This regional rural civil
defense program was terminated by the Defense Department after budget cuts in 1968
and as the nation’s view towards civil defense started to diminish. By the late 1960s and

85

Devine, 428
Devine, 428.
87
Extension Service Records, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University
Libraries, Box 73 “Rural Civil Defense 1962-1964.”
86

35

early 1970s, Americans, as well as state and federal governments, started to lose faith in
civil defense measures as a secure means of protection if the Soviets decided to attack.
While the regional rural civil defense program was cut, the FES offered Oregon the
opportunity to “continue the same Regional Coordinating responsibility for another
program to be funded entirely” by the FES, in recognition of the leadership that the rural
civil defense program in Oregon had on the Pacific Northwest. This allowed aspects of
the rural civil defense program in Oregon to continue into the early 1970s. By 1971, the
rural civil defense program in Oregon and the FES started to turn its focus away from just
civil defense. Instead, the focus moved towards natural disasters and environmental
concerns such as pollution.88
Even before the OSU Extension Service established the Rural Civil Defense
program, the OSU Extension Service worked to ensure that farmers were aware of the
need for civil defense in their rural region. In January 1961, J.W. Scheel, the Assistant
Director of the Cooperative Extension Service at OSU, argued: “the Rural Civil Defense
program has two main objectives… One, to inform rural families (both farm and nonfarm) about the threat of radio active fallout and the defense against it.” While Scheel’s
first point was educational in nature, his second point prompted male farmers to take
direct responsibility for their family and livestock’s protection. Scheel argued that his
second objective was to “induce them [farmers] to prepare family fallout shelters and
take measures to protect their livestock.”89
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Despite only lasting six years, the rural civil defense program in Oregon and the
FES attempted to promote the need for private shelters for rural Oregonians as well as
shelters for their livestock. Unlike many other parts of the country, most houses in
Oregon and the Northwest did not have a basement or form of cellar that were more
common in the Midwest and rest of the nation. Without this basic form of shelter, rural
Northwesters were advised to create their own fallout shelter and shield their livestock
from fallout.
James J. McAlister, the rural defense specialist at OSU authored a three-page
pamphlet entitled “Rural Defense” in which he explained the need for civil defense in
rural areas. McAlister recognized that rural Oregonians might be reluctant to pursue
expensive preparedness measures for their families and livestock when they lived in an
isolated region. According to McAlister, “Planning for a disaster before it occurs seems
to have very little popular appeal.” With little popular support, it was easy for emergency
preparations to be “ rationalized completely out of programs and activities.” McAlister
attempted to change the minds of farm families and county extension agents who read his
pamphlet. His first argument for the necessity of rural civil defense was that it prepared
rural Oregonians for the worst-case scenario, and if a more likely disaster occurred-- such
as floods and other natural disasters-- farmers would be better prepared. McAlister
argued, “If people are prepared to survive this type of disaster” (a nuclear attack) “ they
can then survive any lesser disaster.”90 McAlister’s second argument for reluctant farmers
was that protecting their family and livestock could be done inexpensively and
effectively.
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Logically it can be predicted that…farming areas would most likely not be a
deliberate target. However, the peculiar characteristics of nuclear warfare makes
the farmer as vulnerable as his city neighbor to the major nuclear menace known
as fallout. In the face of such an overwhelming threat what can a farmer do?
Fortunately, there are simple, inexpensive and effective counter measures which
can be employed to reduce the hazard of radioactive fallout on the farm. These
measures involve basically the shielding of people and livestock from harmful
radiations.91

These “simple, inexpensive and effective counter measures” that McAlister
recommended for farmers to protect their livestock included, “hay, grain, earth, cement,
and rocks.” McAlister claimed that these would “provide low-cost effective shielding in
existing farm shelters.”92 McAlister’s insistence to make sure that farmers and county
agents knew that fallout protection could be done inexpensively and effectively shows
that farmers were not directly hesitant towards civil defense, but were instead hesitant in
allocating funds on improvement that they believed would most likely not be necessary.
McAlister’s views on the effectiveness of rural civil defense in Oregon reveal
some frustrations toward the FES and state government’s views on civil defense.
According to McAlister, “Rural defense in the current Oregon situation has very little
opportunity for success as a campaign program…Since Extension’s obligation to the
people and the U.S. Department of Agriculture has not changed, the educational program
must be adapted to overcome the barriers that exist.”93
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Local Promotion of Rural Family and Livestock Fallout Shelters in the Midwest

States created and administered their own civil defense plans and offered varying
levels of support for their rural inhabitants. However, these plans were useless unless
farmers and county officials supported them. While farmers did not have much choice in
their role with evacuation plans, they did have more control in their level of response
toward fallout shelters.
Wabaunsee County is a rural county in Northeast Kansas situated between
Topeka, Junction City, and Manhattan, Kansas. The county provides an example of a
rural county promoting home shelters over public fallout shelters. Located about forty
miles west from the state capital of Topeka, Wabaunsee County provided only five public
shelters for the county’s roughly 6500 residents. Four of the five shelters were in the
county seat of Alma (Wabaunsee County Courthouse, City Hall, Rural High School, and
Rural High School Gym), and the final shelter was in Harveyville (Rural High School),
over thirty miles away from the other public shelters.94 The Wabaunsee County
Commissioners noted in 1970 that there were only 744 public shelter spaces. In addition
to the public shelter spaces, the county commissioners noted that there were “available
home shelter spaces for approximately 3,966 persons” which left “a shortage of
approximately 1,938 shelter spaces for Wabaunsee County.”95 They also noted that the
public shelter spaces were located in Alma and Harveyville and that “rural areas are
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urged to improvise home shelter. Everyone with a basement should use it as their shelter
and are encouraged to invite their neighbors to share it.”96
Like much of the Midwest, many residents in Wabaunsee County had some sort
of an underground cellar that could easily be altered to work as a fallout shelter. An
article in a 1962 edition of Nebraska Farmer showed that these cellars could be used as a
fallout shelter with few changes. "Most farms already have shelters in the form of storm
caves and potato cellars. It's just another step to prepare them for protection against
radioactive fallout. Many of these are already being cleaned up and stocked with food
according to civil defense recommendations. Little effort and expense are required to
make almost any home offer some degree of fallout protection."97
With a majority of their constituents living in a rural area and small towns, the
Wabaunsee County Commissioners also discussed protecting livestock from any fallout
radiation. However, they did not mention or recommend that buildings be reinforced.
Instead, they followed advice similar to the recommendations from McAlister:
You should place as many of your livestock and as much feed as possible in barns
or other covered buildings. A full hayloft affords some shielding from fallout
radiation for animals housed below. Any hay, feed or grain you cannot get into
barns should be covered… Exposure to radiation harms only living creatures.
Therefore if food, water, ect., is covered in such a way that it cannot be
contaminated by fallout dust or particles it will be safe for consumption.98

The Wabaunsee County Commissioners also provided the residents of the county
information on how to properly slaughter any livestock after a nuclear attack. They
stated: “Animals which have grazed on contaminated pastures should be slaughtered and
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muscle meat would be fit for human consumption. However, internal organs… should not
be eaten.” They also noted: “If the radiation level in your area indicates that animal
sickness may be widespread, you probably will be given instructions on slaughtering.
Care must be taken in slaughtering to prevent contamination of the carcass by fallout
particles.”99 Citing the information found in Your Livestock Can Survive Fallout nearly
verbatim, the County Commissioners advised that Wabaunsee residents raise chickens.
Since the birds would be “a particular important direct food resource because they are
relatively resistant to radiation, especially if they are raised under cover, using safe
packaged feeds.”100 Finally, the County Commissioners advised that, “Milk from cows
that have grazed on contaminated pastures would be harmful, especially to children.
Therefore, alternate milk sources (such as canned or powdered milk, or milk from falloutfree areas) should be used for the first few weeks following fallout.”101
However, while Wabaunsee County made recommendations to its rural citizens
on some inexpensive preparations they could do to protect themselves and their families,
a dairy in Nebraska went further. The Roberts Dairy Company outside of Omaha
constructed an underground fallout shelter that was designed to hold over 200 Guernsey
cows, two bulls, and up to fifteen farm hands. The shelter’s existence soon garnered
international attention. In October 1969, The Tuscaloosa News republished a story that
originally appeared in The London Sunday Times on the shelter. The article’s author,
Philip Clarke, argued, “In Omaha, home of America’s Strategic Air Command, they take
both world defense and the milk supply very seriously.”102 Picking up on the USDA and
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FCDA’s theme of maintaining the nation’s food supply in the event of an attack the
dairy’s general safety supervisor, Ed Anderson remarked, “What’s the use of having a lot
of live people left after a nuclear attack if we can’t feed them?”103 The article also took
the time to show readers in both the United Kingdom and the United States, that the
Roberts Dairy was a strong proponent of the Cold War. On the shelter’s large 14-foot
14
door a sign read, “War. Sacrifice for the USA, Suicide for the USSR, nonsense for
everybody.” (Figure 4)104 Even the shelter’s manure drainage system provided the
Roberts Dairy the opportunity to send the Soviet Union a not so subtle message as the
drainage system sloped
ed from West to East.105

Figure 44: The main entrance to the Roberts Dairy fallout shelter.
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The Robert’s Dairy slight jab at the USSR was not the only attempt at rural civil
defense that looked at the ways that animal waste could be used to protect farms in a
103
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metaphorical or literal way. One of the projects that the OSU Rural Civil Defense
program sponsored looked at the feasibility of using common agricultural products,
including liquid manure, to wash fallout particles off the roofs of dairy barns by using a
pump and sprinkler system. The “Engineering Report to Determine the Feasibility of
Using Agricultural Commodities and Decontamination Procedures to Upgrade Dairy
Structures” project, sponsored by the OSU Extension Service Agricultural Engineer,
Walter Matson attempted to “determine if dairy structures in Western Oregon,
Washington and California could be converted into suitable fallout shelters in the event
of nuclear fallout.” These dairy facilities on the western halves of Washington, Oregon
and California produced “approximately 80%” of the region’s “dairy products…about 8
billion pounds of milks for 18 billion people.” 106
Matson saw one principle problem with the design of dairy barns and their use as
suitable shelter for livestock in the event of an attack. Matson reported: “The primary
problem in providing fallout shelter protection under a diary structure as investigated in
this report is the reduction of the overhead contribution of gamma radiation. A solution
for this problem is to use a decontamination agent on the roof. The two liquids available
on dairy farms are water and liquid manure.”107 However, Matson acknowledged that this
study was a first look at using either water or liquid manure to reduce gamma radiation
on dairy barn roofs. Matson argued: “The use of liquid manure as a decontaminations
agent requires research data prior to make recommendations for its use.”108
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While basements or cellar shelters were not often possible in the Western half of
Oregon, where wet winters would have been more like to flood or damaged any
underground structure, cellar shelters were a plausible option in the drier Eastern half of
the state. Matson reported in a biannual report to the USDA in 1967 that he and others
involved in rural civil defense had been active throughout 1967 finding fallout shelters
across the state. In Malheur County in Southeastern Oregon, a county agent had found
that potato cellars could be used as shelters. According to Matson, the county agent had
“observed various structures that might provide fallout shelter. If a structure seemed
feasible, he reported his findings to the County CD Director... In the last year, Malheur
County has increased its number of public fallout shelters in rural areas by 1,056
spaces."109
Radiation Education for Rural Northwest Families

Another aspect of the OSU Extension Service Rural Civil Defense program was
promoting the education of rural Oregonians about the dangers of fallout. While the OSU
extension service worked to educate farmers about the effects of nuclear technology on
their livestock and crops as well how to prepare against it, Oregon 4-H attempted to
educate the next generation of Oregon farmers. 4-Hers participated in “The 4-H TV
Action Series” which included, “ ten, thirty-minute television programs on the subject of
emergency preparedness."110 As an attempt to teach 4-H’ers about radiation, Rural Civil
Defense Specialist, Ellwood D. Miller conducted an “Atomic Easter Egg Hunt” at several
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county 4-H summer camps. The 1967 report noted that over 500 children aged nine to
fourteen had the opportunity to receive “information about radioactivity and resulting
radiation hazards.” After receiving a lecture from Miller the children went on their
“Atomic Easter Egg Hunt.” The report explained that:
The campers were divided into teams of two or threes and each team was given a
geiger counter... The team disassembled the instrument, installed batteries, and
performed an operational check. Prior to the beginning of the instructional period,
the RCD Specialist distributed four sources of uranium within the confines of
well-marked boundaries. These radioactive sources were the atomic easter eggs. It
was the object of the team with their instrument to discover the easter egg using
the radiation given off of the sources of uranium. The rate of radiation being
given off by the source was comparable to the rate from the dial of an illuminate
wristwatch.111
The Rural Civil Defense program also worked to educate local farmers about the
basics of fallout and radiation. In 1965, the Rural Civil Defense program requested funds
from the FES to pursue a project that would use “self-teaching devices” to educate rural
Oregonians about the “basics of nuclear physics.” The project argued that, “The use of
self-teaching devices can cause increased understanding of basic [nuclear] concepts,
arouse interest in the subject matter, and provide a common knowledge level for
conference and workshop participants.” Additionally, “This teaching device could be
utilized through all levels of the Extension program. … Many rural people who work
with Extension agents prefer to work independently rather than attend meetings. This
method of instruction would aid them in securing the basic information needed to
understand other Rural Civil Defense publications.”112 The OSU Extension Service
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hoped that by educating local farmers and their families they would be able to increase
the amount of awareness that these people had toward civil defense.
While the Extension Service Records do not show if the ‘self teaching’ program
ever received funds from the FES, education about the dangers of fallout and the need for
protection from it did makes its way to County agents who passed their knowledge along
to local farmers. One success story that the Rural Civil Defense program made sure to
include in their report to the USDA from the first half of 1966 highlighted a recent event
between the Clackamas County Extension Agent and a group of three farmers. The report
excitedly noted that the example showed, the “tremendous interest that farmers can have
in emergency preparedness if they understand just enough about it to be able to discuss
i[t] intelligently.”113 The report explained that:
Clayton Wills, Clackamas county extension agent, invited three farmers to a
USDA Defense Board meeting. His purpose was to acquaint them with
emergency preparedness and ask them for advice on how to incorporate this into
the on-going extension program in Clackamas country. The film "Radiation
Effects on Farm Animals" was shown to the group and a brief discussion was
presented on shelter for livestock and poultry. The three farmers asked questions
and discussed emergency preparedness for two and one-half hours. They were
thoroughly interested and wanted to develop plans on their own farms
immediately. No scare tactics were used, but facts were presented and the farmers
responded to these facts.114

The example from Clackamas County showed that farmers could be encouraged
through educational tactics to increase their level of emergency preparedness by enacting,
or promising to enact, rural civil defense measures on their property. However, most of
the measures that were enacted across the state followed the recommendations from
McAlister—simple and inexpensive measures. The effectiveness of these measures,
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luckily, was never put to the test, so the amount of protection that shielding livestock and
rural families with common agricultural and natural materials from radioactive fallout
was not tested.

Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War, the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack created a justified
fear. This fear caused the spread of civil defense information across the country that
worked its way down from the federal government, to state civil defense agencies, and
finally made its way to individual rural Americans. However, while the majority of
Americans did live in urban regions of the nation, the federal government expected rural
Americans to bear the burden of caring for urban evacuees as well as providing
protection for their own families and their livelihood, crops and livestock. This placed a
logistical, moral, and financial burden on to the nation’s farmers and other rural
Americans.
Throughout the 1950s when evacuation plans constituted the majority of the
nation’s civil defense plan, the federal government expected rural families to be willing
and able to provide for urban evacuees. However, the federal government often ignored
the idea that rural Americans would not have all of the space, food, water or other
materials to provide for a large temporary group of people. Evacuation plans also often to
take into consideration the different political and cultural views of rural and urban
Americans. Fears over what could happen if large urban centers that including a wide

47

variety of minorities were placed in mostly white and conservative rural regions were
mostly ignored by the FCDA and other civil defense agencies.
At the regional level evacuation plans, again focused on the needs of the
evacuating urban populations and not of the needs that the rural populations would need
to care for the evacuees. Extensive evacuation plans developed in Nebraska and Oregon,
created detailed plans on the evacuation of each state’s main targets. However, in each
state, the evacuation plan provided little information to rural residents on how they were
expected to provide goods and services to the evacuees. In Oregon, the only information
that was directed towards rural Oregonians came from the Capital Press, in one article
that detailed where evacuating Portlanders would be transported to in the aftermath of an
attack if one occurred. While the state’s civil defense director acknowledged that rural
Oregonians and small towns in the state would be essential if Portland were attacked,
Sheets gave little information to the Capital Press’s readers how they were to provide
basic services or how they were suppose to pay for the services.
By the early 1960s, fallout shelters replaced evacuation as the nation’s primary
civil defense measure. As evacuation plans, like the ones established in Nebraska and
Oregon, showed the ridiculousness of moving an entire urban population out of a city and
into rural regions that were still threatened by fallout, civil defense measures moved to
fallout shelters. All across the nation, the FCDA urged family fallout shelters as a way to
ensure that the nation would not fall apart as families and communities banded together
in fallout shelters. The militaristic like tasks that the FCDA focused on militarized the
American family, according to McEnaney. The regimental nature of civil defense tasks
also extended towards rural families as they incorporated the general policies towards
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American families and policies that focused on especially rural concerns of providing
shelter for livestock. Like the rest of the country, rural civil defense tasks were divided
between men and women. As the head of the farm family, male farmers took on civil
defense measures that worked to ensure the protection of their family, land, and livestock
from fallout. Rural and non-rural women alike took on similar tasks in regards to civil
defense. Rural women did domestic tasks such as ensuring that the farm family had a
two-week supply of food in the family shelter and knowing how to prepare potentially
irradiated produce. Home and emergency preparedness tasks, such as first aid, were also
in the domain of rural women’s civil defense tasks.
Regional attempts to provide education about fallout and promoting rural
Midwesterners and Northwesterners to provide shelter for their families and livestock
often fell to State Extension Services. In the Midwest, states like Nebraska and Iowa
encouraged their rural residents to alter their storm cellars into fallout shelters. In Iowa
the Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service, produced a pamphlet geared towards
showing rural Iowans how they could build fallout shelters for their livestock. In Oregon,
the OSU Extension Service sponsored a Rural Civil Defense program that attempted to
educate rural Oregonians and Northwesterners about the fallout threat that they faced.
The Rural Civil Defense program also worked to find inexpensive and effective ways to
shelter rural families and their livestock from fallout.
Local attempts from the OSU Rural Civil Defense program provided education
about fallout, radiation and ways to protect families and livestock from fallout. The Rural
Civil Defense program attempted to create ‘self-teaching devices’ to educate farmers
about the danger that fallout posed to them. When local Extension Agents were able to

49

educate farmers about fallout, they reported success in generating positive views towards
civil defense amongst rural Oregonians. Education about fallout also extended towards
the next generation of Oregon farmers by targeting 4-H’ers at summer camp activities
like the “Atomic Easter Egg Hunt.”
Despite regional differences, including population and military or nuclear sites,
the rural Americans who lived in the Midwest and Northwest during the Cold War often
approached rural civil defense measures in similar ways. In both Nebraska and Oregon,
evacuation plans focused on the concerns of urban populations and mostly ignored the
concerns of rural Nebraskans and Oregonians. While the FCDA and USDA promoted
rural Americans to take proactive measures to ensure the nation's food supply, most rural
Americans did not have the funds to build extensive fallout shelters for their family or
livestock. Most rural Americans in the Midwest and Northwest looked for inexpensive
and creative ways to provide shielding for their family and livestock. Some of these
measures included altering a previously established storm cellar into a fallout shelter.
Other measures included looking at the possibility of using water or liquid manure to
decontaminate the roofs of diary barns. However, while most rural Americans in the
Midwest and Northwest looked for inexpensive ways to provide some protection for their
family or livestock, the Roberts Dairy Farm created an underground fallout shelter that
was large enough to hold 200 cattle and fifteen farm hands for a two-week period.
Despite facing federal civil defense policies that requested that rural Americans take a
high responsibility in ensuring their own protection and the protection of the livestock
and crops, many rural Americans in the Midwest and Northwest found creative ways to
ensure that they protected their families and the nation’s food supply.
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